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FTER the 2006 enactment of Texas' most substantial franchise
tax reform in almost a hundred years, the legislature turned its
attention to, among other things, Technical Corrections of the
revised franchise tax during the 2007 regular session. This Survey focuses
primarily on these legislative changes, as well as and on published court
decisions affecting or interpreting tax issues.
I. SALES TAX
A. REPORTED CASES
In Houston Wire & Cable Co. v. Combs, the appellate court in a memo-
randum opinion affirmed the denial of a sales tax refund for taxpayer's
purchase of cable reels.1 Houston Wire & Cable Co. ("HWC"), a sup-
plier of electrical wire and cable, contended that it qualified for the man-
ufacturing exemption, and that the cable reels on which it ships cable to
customers qualified for a sale-for-resale exemption.2 HWC's central ar-
gument was that the reels possess additional characteristics resulting in a
single wire or cable assembly, distinguishing them as a matter of law from
the "packaging" exclusion described in Texas Tax Code section 151.302.
3
The court, however, held that the reels are merely packaging materials
and not sale-for-resale items.4
As a secondary argument HWC claimed that it was a manufacturer and
its purchase of reels was exempt under the manufacturing exemption.
5
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1. No. 03-07-00006-CV, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 1820 (Tex. App.-Austin Mar. 12,
2008, pet. denied). This case was issued shortly after the Survey period ended, but merits
inclusion. Consistent with this inclusion, cases discussed in last year's Survey are not dis-
cussed again here.
2. Id. at *3.
3. Id. at *7, *9 (discussing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.302 (Vernon 2008)). The
court noted that the manufacturing exemption had changed during the relevant period, but
concluded that the changes were not material to this case. Id.




The parties did not dispute that the reels qualified as "ingredients or com-
ponent parts" under the exemption, but the court found that HWC's op-
erations do not amount to "manufacturing, processing, or fabrication"
within the meaning of Tax Code section 151.318(d) and Rule 3.300(a). 6
The court concluded that HWC's product is the cable, not the cable as-
semblies, and that the reels are packaging for the cable. Therefore, "none
of the changes made to the reels amount to processing of the product."'7
In addition, the court found that HWC does not transform the cable and
does nothing to change the cable's intrinsic characteristics, "so HWC can-
not be said to be engaging in processing."'8 The court also noted that
HWC was not a fabricator because it does nothing to make the cable
itself work in a new or different manner. 9 In sum, HWC was not a manu-
facturer, and the reels did not qualify for the sale-for-resale exemption
because the reels were packaging within the section 151.302(c) and (d)
exclusion.
In another case related to the manufacturing exemption, Sabine Mining
Co. v. Combs, the Corpus Christi Court of Appeals affirmed a finding
that Sabine Mining Co. ("Sabine") was not entitled to a refund for sales
tax paid on replacement parts for draglines (crane-like machines used in
coal surface mining) used to remove overburden in order for the manu-
facturer to access coal.' 0 The court determined that draglines are not
property used directly in the manufacturing of coal because draglines do
not directly make a chemical or physical change to marketable coal, and
because surface mining is not a stage in the actual manufacturing of the
coal. 1 The court considered what it viewed as legislative intent underly-
ing the 1997 amendments to Texas Tax Code section 151.318 (a)(2) relat-
ing to property used in the manufacturing process. Those amendments
added the following, italicized language to the section which allows an
exemption for: "tangible personal property directly used or consumed in
or during the actual manufacturing[,] ... is necessary or essential to the
manufacturing[,j . . .and directly makes or causes a chemical or physical
change to ... the product being manufactured." 12 In deciding whether
the draglines directly caused a chemical or physical change, the court in-
terpreted the 1997 legislative intent to rebuke the reasoning of the 1996
6. Id. at *13 (discussing TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(d) (Vernon 2008) and 34
TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.300 (2008) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts, Manufacturing)).
7. Id. at *17.
8. Id. at *18.
9. Id. at *19.
10. Sabine Mining Co. v. Combs, No. 13-06-330-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6766, at *1(Tex. App.-Corpus Christi Aug. 23, 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.).
11. Id. at *10-11.
12. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.318(a) (Vernon 2008) (emphasis added).
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Tyler Pipe13 and Chevron14 cases, which had more broadly construed the
manufacturing exemption to include not only equipment that directly
changed the final product, but also equipment that is one-step removed
from the final product. The court construed the new language of section
151.318 very narrowly finding that the changes to the coal were not a
"direct" result of the draglines because air intervened to cause the coal to
dry and water to escape. 15 As a result, the court viewed "direct" as im-
plying "a close link with no intervening causes."1 6 In addition, the court
determined that the draglines do not actually manufacture, "but merely
prepare the site for coal removal," so that the actual manufacturing as
required by the statute, "occurs later when the coal is processed and
made ready to be transformed.' 17
B. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
Although there was no sweeping overhaul of sales tax statutes during
the Survey period, legislators enacted multiple changes, including several
that impact exemptions or exclusions. For example, the 2007 legislative
session excluded from "real property service[s]" certain services provided
by a landman that are "necessary to negotiate or secure land or mineral
rights."' 8 The legislature also amended the definition of "[s]ale for re-
sale" by inserting the phrase "in the normal course of business" to the
resale requirements (which, according to the comptroller's staff, merely
confirms current policy) and added a new subsection (b) that provides
that the transfer of a wireless voice communication device as an integral
part of a taxable service is a sale for resale regardless of "whether there is
a separate charge for the wireless voice communication device or whether
the purchaser is the provider of the taxable service, if payment for the
service is a condition for receiving the wireless voice communication de-
vice." 19 In a related change, the legislature amended section 151.0103 to
exempt "a pay telephone coin sent-paid telephone call," but the exemp-
tion only applies to the "portion of the sales price of the telecommunica-
tion service that is paid by coin." °20 The legislature also extended the
sunset date for the Texas emissions reduction plan surcharge.
21
13. Sharp v. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., 919 S.W.2d 157, 163 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ
denied) (holding for a pipe-manufacturing company which sought a tax exemption under
section 151.318, as then in effect, for materials used to make molds which were then used
to size and shape the pipes it sold).
14. Sharp v. Chevron Chem. Co., 924 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996, writ
denied) (holding for producer of plastics which claimed pipes used to transport plastic-
producing chemicals within a plastic factory were exempt because the transportation of the
chemicals from one point to another was a stage in the manufacturing of plastic).
15. Sabine Mining, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 6766, at *9.
16. Id. at *11.
17. Id. at *14-16.
18. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 151.0048 (Vernon 2008).
19. § 151.006.
20. § 151.0103(a)(4)-(b).
21. § 151.0515(d) (the surcharge expires Aug. 31, 2013).
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In a change that came about in part because of concerns presented to
the comptroller, the legislature modified section 151.056 by adding a new
subsection which defines "ready mix concrete contractor," provides spe-
cific rules for such contractors, and requires that the tax rate be applied
to the price of materials based on the greater of fair market value or
invoice price (except for invoices submitted for a public works project). 22
The legislature also revised section 151.313 dealing with FDA approved
drugs,23 modified section 151.318 regarding the manufacturing exemption
as it applies to certain pharmaceutical biotechnology clean rooms and
equipment,24 changed the sales tax holiday for certain clothing and foot-
wear,25 and modified provisions regarding certain aircraft exemptions.26
In addition, the legislature added new provisions regarding "energy-effi-
cient" products sold over Memorial Day weekend,27 added an exemption
for "tangible personal property used to process, re-use or recycle waste
water that will be used in fracturing work performed at an oil or gas
well," 28 and revised section 151.429 relating to tax refunds for enterprise
projects. 29 The legislature also modified miscellaneous sections regarding
the motor fuel,30 and hotel occupancy taxes, 31 among other Tax Code
changes.
Although this Survey typically does not address telecommunications
gross receipts cases, the Austin Court of Appeals decision in Combs v.
Evercom Systems, Inc.,32 is notable because it examines the application of
the Texas Public Utility Commission's assessment on the gross receipts of
all public utilities within the commission's jurisdiction. The legislature
initially adopted the assessment in 1975 in order to help cover the costs of
the commission's operations. In particular, Evercom argued that it
should not be subject to the assessment because it was a non-dominant
interexchange carrier, as opposed to a carrier determined by the commis-
sion to have sufficient market power to control prices, and thus did not
meet the definition of a public utility.33 The court rejected this argument,
holding that Evercom's reading of the statute was too narrow, and con-
cluding instead that the assessment applies equally to non-dominant car-











32. No. 03-06-00481-CV, 2007 WL 1295811, at *2-3 (Tex. App.-Austin May 1, 2007,
no pet.) (mem. op.).




Even before the 2006 legislative session adjourned, it was clear that
technical corrections were necessary to address problems created by in-
consistencies in the statutory language of the revised franchise tax.
35
Thus, against the backdrop of the enactment of a substantially revised
franchise tax, legislators, the comptroller's office, and taxpayers worked
to craft amendatory language. As with almost all technical corrections
bills, the revisions include not only minor clean-up amendments but also
more significant changes. In this discussion of the revised tax, it is worth
noting that the revised tax is sometimes labeled "the margin tax." This is
an appropriate label since the tax is imposed on a business's "margin," as
defined under the Tax Code. However, some argue that the tax is techni-
cally still the "franchise tax."
1. Combined reporting
As noted in last year's Survey, the revised franchise tax marks a dra-
matic change from Texas' long-time single-entity reporting methodol-
ogy. 36 One of the most significant changes made by the Technical
Corrections bill3 7 was to modify the definition of "controlling interest"
used to determine whether an entity should be included in an "affiliated
group."'38 As revised in 2006, the franchise tax requires-for the first
time in Texas history -certain affiliated entities to file combined returns
if they are engaged in a unitary business.39 Prior to Technical Correc-
tions, the ownership threshold had been eighty percent. However, the
legislature changed the test to "more than 50 percent" for all entity forms
subject to the tax.40 This change means that entities such as corporations,
partnerships, and other taxable entities engaged in a unitary business are
required to file a combined report based on a much lower common own-
ership threshold than under the original margin tax standards. The own-
ership criteria in both the original 2006 legislative language and in the
new 2007 section regarding limited liability companies41 continues to be
phrased in the disjunctive such that, for example, a controlling interest in
35. See, e.g., Cynthia M. Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 60 SMU L. REV. 1311, 1317
(2007); Cynthia M. Ohlenforst, The New Texas Margin Tax: More than a Marginal Change
to Texas Taxation, 60 TAX LAWYER 959, 960 (2007).
36. See Ohlenforst et al., supra note 35, at 1331-32.
37. See Act effective June 15, 2007, 80th Leg., 3rd C.S., ch. 1282 § 1, sec. 171.001, 2007
Tex. Gen. Laws 4282 (West) [hereinafter "Technical Corrections"]; Act effective Sept. 1,
2007, 80th Leg., 3rd C.S., ch. 1195, § 1, sec. 22, ch. 1, 2007 Tex. Gen. Laws 4095 (West).
Technical Corrections amended the changes enacted by House Bill 3 ("H.B. 3") in 2005.
Tex. H.B. 3, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (2006).
38. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0001(8) (Vernon 2008).
39. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1014(a) (Vernon 2008).
40. Technical Corrections, supra note 37.
41. Technical Corrections also added a new subsection defining a controlling interest
in an LLC as either more than fifty percent, owned directly or indirectly of the total mem-
bership interest of the LLC or more than fifty percent, owned directly or indirectly of the
beneficial ownership interest in the membership of the LLC. Technical Corrections, supra
note 37, at 2.
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a partnership can be either more than fifty percent of the capital or more
than fifty percent of the profits interest in the partnership. Thus, if one
entity holds more than fifty percent of the profits, and a different entity
holds more than fifty percent of the capital, the comptroller theoretically
could have asserted that the partnership be deemed a member of two
different combined groups. The comptroller has dealt with this situa-
tion-as well as with other similar situations in which an entity could be
required to file in two separate groups-by adopting Rule 3.590, which
provides that an entity that is a member of more than one affiliated group
and has a "unitary relationship with more than one of those affiliated
groups [may] elect to be treated as a member of only one group. '42
This rule is one of several that the comptroller issued in draft form and,
later, in proposed form during this Survey period. 43 These rules were
superseded by final rules that were adopted after the end of the Survey
period.44 Therefore, although this article does not discuss the final rules
in depth, they set forth several examples to demonstrate when an entity
("Parent") that owns a controlling interest in another entity ("Subsidi-
ary") will be deemed to own one hundred percent of the Subsidiary's
ownership interest in a third entity for purposes of determining whether
the entities are commonly controlled. Essentially, these rules require that
in any circumstance in which Parent controls Subsidiary by meeting the
more-than-fifty-percent test, Parent will be treated as owning any interest
controlled by Subsidiary. 45 These rules apply not only to corporate enti-
ties, but also to other taxable entities such as trusts, partnerships, and
limited liability companies, all of which could be included in a single com-
bined return.46
In another change related to combined reporting, the legislature re-
vised the definition of a "unitary business" to modify the list of specific
factual criteria that the comptroller is to consider in assessing whether an
affiliated group is unitary.47 Now the comptroller can argue that the leg-
islature intended to make a meaningful change when it replaced the
"and" with an "or" in the list of "any relevant factor" (so that the list now
refers to whether activities of the group members are in the "same gen-
eral line," "are steps in a vertically structured enterprise," or "whether
the members are functionally integrated"). However, from a gramma-
rian's standpoint, the list remains-as it was before Technical Correc-
tions-a list of relevant factors to consider in making the unitary business
determination. The comptroller further tackled the interpretation of the
unitary business concept in Rule 3.590, which includes presumptions that
42. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.590(b)(4)(F) (2008) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,
Combined Reporting).
43. See 32 Tex. Reg. 6271, 6271 (2007) (codified at 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.581)
(proposed Sept. 14, 2007) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts).
44. See 32 Tex. Reg. 10013, 100013 (2007) (codified at 39 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.581).
45. See 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.590(b)(6) (2008) (Comptroller of Pub. Accounts,
Combined Reporting).
46. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002(a) (Vernon 2008).
47. § 171.0001(17).
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affiliated entities are unitary, and that an acquired business is unitary
upon acquisition. 48
Despite legislative changes, combined reporting issues continue to con-
fuse and complicate compliance for Texas taxpayers who have spent years
with strict single-entity, separate company reporting. Technical Correc-
tions addressed some, but not all, of these issues. Section 171.1014(d), for
example, has been amended to clarify that, regardless of a combined
group's choice with respect to deductions (i.e., either cost of goods sold
("COGS") or compensation), the combined group's taxable margin can-
not exceed seventy percent of the combined group's total revenue.49 This
clarification resolves, in favor of higher taxes, an ambiguity in the pre-
Technical Corrections legislation. Because all members of a combined
group must use the same deduction approach, the group's total tax liabil-
ity will drive the deduction election. Thus, some members may be re-
quired to use a disadvantageous method. For example, a service provider
affiliate that is in a COGS combined group would effectively get no de-
duction because, on a stand-alone basis, it has no COGS deduction. The
amendment to section 171.1014(d) makes clear that a member of a com-
bined group cannot rely on the seventy percent cap otherwise applicable
to single entities in calculating total revenue to be included in the group's
total revenue. Thus, one hundred percent of such an affiliate's total reve-
nue could be included in the tax base.
A tax change more favorable to taxpayers can be found in section
171.1014(d-1), which provides that a member of a combined group may
claim as COGS the costs incurred for goods that are owned by another
member of the combined group as a COGS deduction.50 This provision is
designed to avoid the unintended consequence implied by H.B.3 of disal-
lowing a COGS deduction simply because one member of a combined
group incurred the cost while another member owned the goods.
Note that new section 171.1014(h) clarifies that a combined group must
compute its tax with reference to business done during the same period
for each group member.51 However, when group members have different
accounting periods, it may not be clear which accounting period must be
used by the group as a whole, so the comptroller's guidance becomes es-
pecially important.
New section 171.1014(i) has been the subject of much recent discus-
sion, as it deems each member of a combined group jointly and severally
liable for the combined group's margin tax liability.52 Although joint and
several liability may not be unusual in some types of combined or consoli-
dated reporting, the changes in the common control threshold from
eighty to fifty percent, coupled with a renewed focus on a broad concept
48. 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.590(b)(6). These presumptions which do not appear in
the statute, may be over reaching.






of unitary, makes this a troubling prospect for many entities, including
partnerships.
2. Passive Entities
The revised franchise tax excludes from taxation those entities in which
at least ninety percent of gross income as calculated under the federal tax
code is derived from certain passive activities. 53 As originally drafted,
passive income included "gains from the sale of real property. ' 54 Tax-
payer elation at being able to treat all gains from the sale of real property
as passive was short lived since the legislature quickly changed this provi-
sion to include only to "capital" gains.55
The exclusion for passive entities requires both that an entity have no
less than ninety percent passive income and no more than ten percent
active income. Given the obvious fact that ninety percent plus ten per-
cent equals one hundred percent, it is unclear whether there could ever
be a circumstance in which an entity could meet the ninety percent test
but fail the ten percent test. Therefore, the ten percent test is widely
considered surplusage. Many practitioners and taxpayers had hoped that
the legislature would repeal the ten percent active income test. The legis-
lature's failure to repeal the ten percent test may tempt comptroller rep-
resentatives to assert that income should be measured differently for the
ninety percent test than for the ten percent test. However, early pro-
posed guidance from the comptroller, which suggested that passive in-
come could, in certain circumstances, be considered active income, was
not carried over to the regulations.
Note also that the exclusion for passive entities is just that-an exclu-
sion. Although it has sometimes been characterized as an exemption, it is
in fact an exclusion. In view of the different burdens of proof associated
with showing that a taxpayer is entitled to an exemption as opposed to an
exclusion, this difference may be significant.
Other changes related to passive entity classification include cleanup
changes to make clear that the characterization of a passive entity is tied
to a particular return period, so that the tax is not imposed on an entity if
53. The legislature did not extend the opportunity to qualify as a passive entity to
entities other than partnerships and trusts that are not business trusts. Therefore, non-
business trusts and partnerships remain preferred vehicles for businesses that would be
subject to the tax but for the fact that their income could allow them to meet the passive
entity test. The legislative decision to limit passive entity status to only trusts and partner-
ships is based on multiple factors, including these entities' utility as vehicles for bringing oil
and gas real estate investors and other investors into the state, and the high cost-in terms
of tax revenue that would be lost-of extending passive, nontaxable status to other entities.
54. Tex. H.B. 3, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (2006).
55. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0003(a)(2)(C) (Vernon 2008). This change not only
reduced the amount of gain on a transaction that could be counted as passive, but also gave
rise to questions concerning federal tax recapture amounts (for example, depreciation, typ-
ically treated as ordinary income on the disposition of operating properties). In informal
advice, comptroller staff has confirmed that I.R.C. § 1231 gain will be considered capital
gain but also indicated that they will consider recapture amounts as ordinary (that is, non-
passive) "active income" for purposes of this test.
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the entity qualified as a passive entity during the reporting period.5 6
3. Taxable Entities
Technical Corrections also made other changes that impact which enti-
ties are subject to the margin tax. As noted in last year's Survey, there
were several unintended "cliff rules" (that is, one misstep and your fall
off a cliff, perhaps without ever having known the cliff was there) in the
original enactment. 57 For example, section 171.0002(c)(2) provided that a
nontaxable general partnership comprised entirely of natural persons
would be nontaxable but would become taxable if a partner died and the
partner's interest were held by the partner's estate. Technical Correc-
tions eliminated this particular cliff by redefining natural person to in-
clude the estate of the human being. 58
Other changes:
* Section 171.0002(a) now specifically includes a limited liability
partnership as a taxable entity,59 a change designed to conform statu-
tory effect with legislative intent that lawyers, accountants, and
others operating in limited liability partnerships (which are techni-
cally general partnerships) are subject to the tax.
0 Section 171.0002(b) further confirms legislative intent that the
general partnership exclusion does not apply to a general partnership
with statutorily limited liability.60
* Section 171.0002(c)(4), which sets forth additional requirements
for a family limited partnership to qualify as a passive entity, was
repealed. 6 1 This change, like many of those discussed in this Survey,
is designed to eliminate drafting glitches. The correction confirms
the legislative intent that a family limited partnership ("FLP") which
meets the definition of a passive entity is not taxable, regardless of
whether it meets the additional requirements set forth in this re-
pealed section. 62
0 Section 171.0002 was further amended to repeal subsections that
imposed additional requirements on passive investment partnerships
in trusts. 63
* The legislature confirmed that certain other entities are nontax-
able by specifically providing that certain non-profit self-insurance
56. § 171.001(c).
57. Ohlenforst et al., supra note 35, at 1319-20.
58. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0001(11-a) (Vernon 2008).
59. § 171.0002(a). See also 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.582(c)(1)(c) (2008) (Comptrol-
ler of Pub. Accounts, Combined Reporting) (indicating, consistent with legislative intent,
that a limited liability partnership may qualify for treatment as a passive entity).
60. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002(b) (Vernon 2008).
61. Technical Corrections, supra note 37.
62. The additional requirements were apparently a carry over from an earlier draft,
designed to insure that FLP's could qualify as non-taxable entities. However, the addi-
tional requirements imposed by the section could have created confusion as well as the risk
that the comptroller or a court would have concluded that an FLP must meet not only the
passive entity test set forth for other taxpayers, but also the separate, additional require-
ments formerly included in this section.




trusts and trusts qualified under Internal Revenue Code section
401(a) are not taxable. 64
• Legislators also amended section 171.0002(d) to provide that sole
proprietorships formed under the statutes of a foreign country that
limit liability are subject to the tax.65 This amendment is designed to
reach those forms of business whose individual owners are shielded
from personal liability, consistent with the legislature's general intent
that most limited liability entities are subject to the tax.
4. Definitions and Other Changes
Technical Corrections revised the definition of the Internal Revenue
Code to provide that the Tax Code does not include changes made by
federal law after January 1, 2007.66 Technical Corrections also broadened
the definition of "lending institution" to include any entity that makes
loans and: (1) is regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commis-
sion; (2) is regulated by the Office of Thrift Supervision; (3) "is licensed
by, registered with, or otherwise regulated by the Department of Savings
and Mortgage Lending; [(4)] is a "broker" or "dealer" as defined in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . .; or [(5)] provides financing to unre-
lated parties solely for agricultural production. '67
The definition of "security" is relevant in multiple places in the revised
franchise tax code, including for purposes of determining revenue (in cal-
culating the tax basis of securities underwritten 68 and the basis of securi-
ties sold) 69 and apportionment of gross proceeds arising from certain
sales of securities.70 However, H.B.3 did not include a specific definition
64. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0002(c)(6) (Vernon 2008) (non-profit self insur-
ance trusts created under TEX. INS. CODE § ch. 2212 (Vernon 2007); § 171.0002(c)(7)
(trusts qualified under I.R.C. § 401(a)). Many section 401(a) retirement plans may own
assets through wholly owned subsidiaries or joint venture entities; these subsidiaries/joint
ventures are not explicitly listed as nontaxable entities, and the Comptroller is working to
determine the scope of this exclusion.
65. § 171.0002(d).
66. § 171.0001(9). This change is consistent with Texas' legislators' long-term practice
of defining the Internal Revenue Code as of a stagnant point in time, generally to minimize
concerns that they could be unconstitutionally delegating taxing powers to the federal gov-
ernment. The impact carries forward another of Texas' long-held traditions of creating a
gap between the Internal Revenue Code as it applies to taxpayers' federal tax returns and
the Internal Revenue Code as it applies to franchise tax calculations that are based on the
Code.
67. § 171.0001(10). The subject of much debate and redrafting, this provision more
specifically defines lending institutions, which are entitled to treat certain interest expenses
as deductible costs of goods sold. The Tax Code provides that lending institutions, other
than entities "primarily engaged in an activity described by category 5932 [used merchan-
dise stores] of the 1987 Standard Industrial Classification Manual," may subtract interest
expense. § 171.1012(k). Both industry-affiliated lenders (for example, seller financiers)
and banks and other lenders had expressed concern with the definition of lending institu-
tion, and the language from the early versions of the Technical Corrections was changed in






of "security." After considering multiple alternative definitions, legisla-
tors elected in Technical Corrections to tie the definition of securities to
the Internal Revenue Code, but "only" for purposes of the three sections
above.71 Technical Corrections does not state the definition of securities
will apply in other franchise tax contexts, such as for purposes of the sec-
tion 171.003(a)(2)(c) passive entity test, leaving room for both interpreta-
tion and argument.
Another securities-related provision is new section 171.106(f), which
provides that if a loan or security is treated as inventory of the seller for
federal income tax purposes, then the gross proceeds of a sale of such
loan or security are gross receipts for apportionment purposes.72 This
Technical Correction change followed much discussion of the legislative
intent underlying H.B.3 to maintain pre-margin tax apportionment rules
for lenders. Indeed, the industry had suggested to the comptroller's of-
fice could make the change by regulation without a Technical Correction,
although the legislative resolution is a much cleaner fix.
Technical Corrections also made several changes that were just that-
technical corrections-including revisions to the mechanics of consumer
price index adjustments. 73 Section 171.203 has been modified to clarify
that the section 171.203 public information report requirements are im-
posed on limited liability companies as well as corporations.74 Section
171.002, as originally drafted, would have based the tax rate on each year
of the privilege period, arguably resulting in a higher tax than the stated
rates. Changes to this section corrected this drafting error by tying the
rate to the privilege period.75 Other changes to section 171.002 make tax
rates subject to section 171.003 (increase in rate requires voter ap-
proval)76 and section 171.1016" E-Z Computation and Rate). 77 The rele-
vant rate period is now the "per 12-month period on which the margin is
based." 78
In several places, legislators changed the starting point of gross revenue
as it appears on the federal tax return from the amounts "entered" to
amounts "reportable as income."'79 Section 171.1011(b) refers to reporta-
ble income as "the amount entered to the extent the amount entered
complies with federal income tax law."' 80 These changes reflects the legis-
lators' concern that taxpayers might be able to play games with the mar-
71. Technical Corrections, supra note 37.
72. Id. See also 34 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.582(b)(10) (2008) (Comptroller of Pub.
Accounts, Passive Entities) (defining security for purposes of the passive income calcula-
tion as being limited to securities in which the holder has an interest that is less than or
equal to fifty percent). Taxpayers may well challenge this section as it does not appear to
have statutory support. Id.










gin tax by "entering" amounts on a federal tax return that would not
impact the taxpayer's federal tax liability but might be artificially low
enough to reduce margin tax and result in inaccurate underreporting.
Legislators also revised section 171.1015, which addresses reporting for
certain partnerships in tiered partnership arrangements. While the revi-
sions fixed the confusing language by which lower-tier referred to upper-
tier, and vice versa, multiple questions about tiered reporting still re-
main.81 Additional amendments to section 171.1015(b) provide that an
upper-tier entity may include its allocable share of the total revenue of a
lower-tier entity in determining its own taxable margin, and that a lower-
tier entity is liable for its own margin tax to the extent a related upper tier
entity is not subject to the tax.82
New section 171.1015(d) provides that the minimum $1,000 tax or
$300,000 total revenue requirements for application of the tax do not ap-
ply to an upper-tier entity if a lower-tier entity attributing total revenue
to it does not satisfy one of the minimum requirements. 83 The comptrol-
ler could argue that this provision disallows the small business exemption
to any small taxable entity that owns an interest of any size in a flow-
through entity with tax or revenues that exceed the exemption thresholds,
irrespective of whether the small upper-tier entity actually reports alloca-
ble total revenue from the larger lower-tier entity. Such an interpreta-
tion, however would appear contrary to the legislative intent to reduce
the tax burden on small businesses.
Legislators considered, but did not adopt, proposed amendments to
section 171.1011 that would have allowed taxable entities to exclude from
revenue net distributed income from exempt passive entities. This con-
cept was abandoned late in the legislative process. The resulting passive
entity treatment is, in some ways, an exception to the margin tax's anti-
pyramiding principle, which generally allows upper-tier entities to ex-
clude from revenue net distributed income from lower-tier flow-through
entities.
Other changes to section 171.1011 include changes designed to correct
two significant drafting glitches in H.B.3 relating to federal tax partner-
ships.84 Prior to Technical Corrections, "revenue" included certain net
income from rental real property instead of gross income, and double
81. § 171.1015. See also § 171.1011(c)(1)(B) (a more concise provision relating to cor-
porations' ability to deduct net distributed income from federal tax partnerships and S
Corporations).
82. Tex. H.B. 3, 79th Leg., 3d C.S. (2006). H.B.3 had provided that upper-tier entities
could report allocable shares of "taxable margin" of lower-tier entities (for example, after
deductions and apportionment at the lower-tier), while Technical Corrections provides that
upper-tier entities can report allocable shares of "total revenue." Id. The section does not
explicitly provide a corresponding right for an upper-tier entity to report its allocable share
of a lower-tier entity's COGS or compensation deduction, nor does it explicitly address
apportionment issues.
83. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.1015(d) (Vernon 2008).
84. See § 171.1011(c)(2).
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counted guaranteed payments.85 Modifying the tax base to include gross
rentals rather than net rentals created additional fiscal note revenue,
which legislators used to fund other legislative changes, including the ad-
ditional relief for small businesses.
Under revised section 171.1011(d), any taxable entity that is part of a
federal consolidated group must compute its total revenue under section
171.1011(c) as if it had filed a separate return for federal income tax
purposes. 86
New section 171.0021 provides a discount for certain small businesses.
One of the most popular changes in Technical Corrections, this section-
added in the Senate Committee substitute-effectively extends partial re-
lief from the margin tax rates to taxpayers with revenues of up to
$900,000.87
Section 171.1013(b-1), one of the relatively few margin tax incentives
directly intended to influence taxpayers' behavior, allows small employ-
ers as defined by section 1501.002 of the Insurance Code that have not
previously provided healthcare benefits to any of their employees to
gross up their compensation deductions for such benefits in the first two
years they begin providing health care benefits by fifty percent and
twenty-five percent, respectively.88
5. Deductions for Costs of Goods Sold and Compensation
Revised section 171.101(d) no longer explicitly provides that taxable
entities may change their COGS/Compensation election by filing an
amended return, and requires instead that a taxable entity notify the
comptroller of its deduction choice no later than the due date of its an-
nual report.89 However, it is not clear whether this change means that a
taxpayer who files a return based on one method (COGS or Compensa-
tion) will be unable to change its return, even if subsequent interpretation
of the law or change in circumstances make the original election less
favorable. Several other legislative changes address the calculation of the
deductions.
The section 171.1012(a)(3)(A) definition of "tangible personal prop-
erty" now explicitly includes live and prerecorded television and radio
85. Id.
86. §§ 171.1011(c)-(d). See also § 171.1011(g-3)(3) (revising the exclusion from reve-
nue for attorneys providing pro bono services from actual out-of-pocket costs capped at
$500 per case to a flat deduction of $500 per case-at a one percent rate, the provision
offers five dollars tax relief per case.); § 171.1011(g-4) ("A taxable entity that is a phar-
macy cooperative shall exclude from its total revenue . . . [any applicable] flow-through
funds from rebates from pharmacy wholesalers that are distributed to the pharmacy coop-
erative's shareholders.").
87. § 171.0021. Taxpayers with revenues of $300,000 - $400,000 are entitled to an
eighty percent tax rate discount; revenue of 400,000 - $500,000 merit a sixty percent dis-
count; revenues of $500,000 - $700,000 merit a forty percent discount and revenues of





programs, books, and other similar property embodying ideas, "without
regard to the means or methods of distribution or the medium in which
the property is embodied." This confirms that such property can qualify
for COGS deductions. 90 New section 171.1012(o) contains special in-
structions for the subtraction of COGS for any entity whose principal
business activity is film or television production or broadcasting or the
distribution of films, TV, and radio programs, as well as for other subsec-
tion (a)(3)(A)(ii) taxable personal property. Like the changes to the def-
inition of tangible personal property, these changes confirm the original
legislative intent and earlier comptroller rulings regarding the deductions
available in the context of the film and broadcast industries.
The legislature also revised section 171.1012(c)(6) to provide that de-
preciation, depletion, and amortization deductible under this subsection
as a COGS must be calculated as reported on the federal income tax
return on which the franchise tax report is based.91 As noted above, sig-
nificant discussion during the legislative session focused on the interplay
between federal income tax reporting and the franchise tax.
Section 171.1012(g) also now provides that an entity may expense or
capitalize COGS to the same extent as can be done on its federal income
tax return.92 Subsection (g) contains detailed instructions about the capi-
talization of costs. Although this section also reflects the legislators' con-
cerns with the link between federal and state tax reporting, the provision
also allows taxpayers more flexibility in determining whether to capitalize
or to deduct certain costs. Legislators also introduced new language to
subsection (g) which was designed to prevent taxpayers from switching
back and forth between capitalizing and expensing certain amounts in
order to "double-dip" on deductions.
The section 171.1013(a) definition of "wages and cash compensation"
has been modified to refer to net distributive income from all taxable
entities treated as partnerships for federal income tax purposes or net
distributive income from limited liability companies treated as sole pro-
prietorships for federal income tax purposes, but in each case, only if the
person receiving the distribution is a natural person.93 Several unadopted
proposals would have allowed a broader compensation deduction for
amounts paid to a single member LLC, single-shareholder professional
corporation, or professional association, in order to provide relief to pro-
fessionals who practice through these entities.
Amendments to section 171.1013(b)(2) clarify that taxable entities
electing the compensation deduction may deduct the costs of all benefits
provided to officers, directors, owners, partners, and employees, but only








clarification eliminated an ambiguity in H.B.3 regarding whether taxpay-
ers could claim margin tax deductions for benefits that may not have
been deductible for federal income tax purposes.
Section 171.1013(c) provides that, notwithstanding the actual amount
of wages and cash compensation paid by a taxable entity to its officers,
directors, owners, partners, and employees, a taxable entity may not in-
clude more than $300,000 or the amount determined under section
171.006 for each twelve-month period upon which the margin is based.
The amended version of section 171.1014(f)(1) clarifies that the $300,000
compensation deduction per employee ceiling applies at a combined
group level, rather than at the group member level.95 Comptroller staff
had expressed concern that taxpayers would spread salaries across multi-
ple entities in an effort to circumvent the $300,000 cap. 96
Technical Corrections also address staff-leasing and management com-
pany situations by treating workers assigned by such companies to an op-
erating business, as if the individuals were employed by the operating
business, for purposes of computing revenue and related compensation
deductions. The bill amendment to these provisions thus places short-
term employment arrangements on the same footing as long-term staff
leasing arrangements by treating the client company as the recipient of
the compensation deduction. 97
6. Business Loss Carryover
Technical Corrections also fixed the business loss carryover provisions.
Section 171.111(b)(1) now provides that the basis for determining this
credit is the business loss amount determined under section 171.110(e),
and not exhausted on a report originally due prior to January 1, 2008.98
This language fixes the confusing language from H.B.3 which had re-
ferred to net operating loss carryforwards and temporary accounting dif-
ferences. Section 171.111(b) also changed the percentage of the loss
credit that a taxable entity may take in each of the twenty years across
which the loss credit is spread (2.25% in each of the first ten years; 7.75%
in each of the last ten) and provides that the credit be measured by refer-
ence to the 4.5% tax rate-the rate in effect when the losses were in-
curred. Section 171.111(d) now provides that a taxable entity that
95. § 171.1014(f)(1).
96. Query whether members of an affiliated group that are not engaged in a unitary
business-and therefore are not a combined group-may each deduct up to $300,000 for com-
pensation paid to a common employee.
97. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.0001(6) (Vernon Supp. 2008). The amendment modi-
fies the definition of temporary employment service by incorporating a reference to TEX.
LABOR CODE ANN. § 93.001(2) (Vernon Supp. 2008), which defines temporary employ-
ment service as "a person who employees individuals for the purpose of assigning those
individuals to the clients of the service to support or supplement the client's workforce in a
special work situation, including: (A) an employee absence; (B) a temporary skill shortage;(C) a seasonal workload; or (D) a special assignment or project."
98. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.111(b) (Vernon 2008).
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changes combined groups after June 30, 2007 loses its right to the credit.99
This section is intended to prevent selling off companies with a loss, not
to penalize companies within a group that changes composition over
time. Although the comptroller's initial guidance on the loss carryover
appeared unduly restrictive, the comptroller subsequently provided some
helpful confirmation. For example, a merger of two combined group
members does not trigger a loss of the credit. Nonetheless, the comptrol-
ler and taxpayers may still face questions and disagreements about this
provision.
Consistent with legislative intent to make the credit available to com-
panies subject to the pre-margin franchise tax, new section 171.111(d-1)
grants were subject to the tax as of May 1, 2006.100 Combined groups
may claim the credit for each member entity that was subject to the tax
on May 1, 2006.101
New section 171.111(d-2) further provides that the credit may not re-
sult in a refund when it is greater than the amount of franchise tax due for
a report, since neither the legislature nor the comptroller intended the
credit as a refund mechanism. 10
2
7. Transition Rules, Apportionment and E-Z Reporting
The comptroller worked hard to provide written, informal guidance to
taxpayers and to circulate draft rules before the year's end. The online
guidance posted by the comptroller earlier in the year confirmed, to the
taxpayer's pleasure, that certain pre-July 1, 2007 mergers by which part-
nerships merged out of existence could still enable taxpayers to reduce
their otherwise higher tax burden.
The legislature considered, but did not adopt, plans to change the ap-
portionment formula from the Joyce to the Finnegan method. 10 3 Instead,
the legislature enacted new section 171.103(c), which requires that a com-
bined group disclose, for informational purposes only, on its initial and
annual reports the Texas gross receipts (including the amount of Texas
gross receipts that are taxable in another state pursuant to a throwback
rule) of each non-nexus group member.1 04 This controversial, require-
ment is designed to allow Texas to quantify the additional tax revenue





103. As enacted, the revised franchise tax utilizes the "Joyce rule" instead of the "Fin-
negan rule." Compare Joyce, Inc., No. 66-SBE-070 (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, Nov. 23,
1966) (all gross receipts of non-nexus combined group members are deemed non-Texas for
purposes of computing the group's apportionment factor, irrespective of the normal sourc-
ing rules), with Finnegan, Corp., No. 88-SBE-022-A (Cal. State Bd. of Equalization, Jan.
24, 1990) (gross receipts of non-nexus group members are sourced for apportionment pur-
pose under the state's regular apportionment rules).
104. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.103(c) (Vernon 2008).
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Taxpayers were pleased, by contrast, with the legislature's repeal of the
unpopular requirement that taxpayers file a proforma ("pretend") mar-
gin tax report on February 15, 2008.
Another controversial provision enacted during the legislative session
provides for an "E-Z method" of calculating the tax owed by smaller tax-
payers. Specifically, new section 171.1016105 provides that a taxable en-
tity with up to ten million dollars in total revenue may elect to pay margin
tax on 0.575 percent of the entity's total revenue that is apportioned to
Texas, and further recognized the availability of the new section 171.0021
step discounts to such electing taxable entities.106 This provision, which
creates a new, simplified calculation for taxpayers with receipts of less
than ten million dollars, was added late in the day by a Senate amend-
ment to the Senate Committee Substitute. While many applauded the
simplified calculation, others worried that the E-Z calculation paves the
way for an almost-always-unpopular gross receipts tax.
III. PROPERTY TAX
A. LEGISLATIVE UPDATE
The long-awaited reduction in property taxes again dominated news
during this Survey period. Perhaps the most significant evidence of legis-
lative intent in a reduction was the House's appropriation of nearly seven
billion dollars each for years 2008 and 2009 to the Texas Education
Agency to fund a reduction in school district property tax rates.10 7 The
legislature also proposed a constitutional amendment capping the
amount by which a property's appraised value could be raised from one
year to the next to ten percent.108 Among other legislative changes dur-
ing the period were the criminalization of communications by appraisal
district board members about property appraisals outside of public hear-
ings,109 an exemption from property tax for certain goods in transit (ex-
cluding oil, natural gas, petroleum products, aircraft, dealer's motor
vehicle inventories, dealer's vessel and outboard motor inventories,
heavy equipment inventories, and retail manufactured housing invento-
ries), 110 and a new requirement that taxing units wishing to increase their
tax rates hold two public hearings and make several pieces of information
publicly available prior to such an increase. 1
B. JUDICIAL DECISIONS AND ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINIONS
Several cases during the review period addressed valuation and proce-
dural issues of interest in the property tax context, and one attorney gen-
105. § 171.1016.
106. § 171.0021.
107. Tex. H.B. 2, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).
108. Tex. H.R.J. Res. 40, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).
109. Tex. H.B. 402, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).
110. Tex. H.B. 621, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).
111. Tex. H.B. 3495, 80th Leg., R.S. (2007).
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eral opinion focused on ex parte communications between an appraisal
district and its appraisal review board. Numerous other property tax
cases during the Survey period addressed issues such as the sovereign
immunity of a taxing municipal corporation absent a claim of fraud, mu-
tual mistake of fact, or duress,112 and the taxability of refined petroleum
products stored in tanks and awaiting transfer into streams of interstate
commerce. 113 An additional attorney general opinion of interest con-
cluded that property held by a charitable organization should not lose its
exemption solely as the result of the property's being unoccupied (for
instance, following a fire). 114
MHCB (USA) Leasing and Finance Corp. v. Galveston Central Ap-
praisal District was a hybrid procedure/valuation case during the review
period that addressed which party has standing to protest an appraisal
review board's valuation and the validity of an appraisal agreement be-
tween a taxpayer and an appraisal district." 5 MHCB (USA) Leasing and
Finance Corp. ("MHCB") owned a refinery unit that it leased to Valero
during 2003, which is the valuation period in dispute.1 6 As part of this
contractual relationship, Valero was obligated to pay property taxes on
the refinery unit.117 In December of 2003, Valero began working with the
district's appraiser to arrive at a value for the property, and ultimately
executed an appraisal agreement with the appraiser which determined
that the refinery unit be valued at roughly sixty million dollars." 8 Later
in March 2004, MHCB sold the unit to Valero. 119
Following the district's first appraisal notice at sixty million dollars, the
district and the appraiser felt political pressure to justify the appraisal,
which some parties considered to be too low.120 Over Valero's objec-
tions, the district issued a revised appraisal of roughly 193 million dol-
lars.121 Valero and MHCB filed a joint protest of this appraisal with the
review board, which was denied, and then filed suit in district court fol-
lowing the district's reappraisal of the unit to 240 million dollars, pursu-
ant to a board order'122
In their district court petition, MHCB and Valero argued that the dis-
trict should be held to the initial appraisal agreement, and alternatively,
that the reappraisal value was excessive and unequal.' 2 3 The district and
the board answered that they were immune from suit as governmental
112. See, e.g., Nivens v. City of League City, 245 S.W.3d 470, 474 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
113. See, e.g., Marathon Ashland Petroleum, L.L.C. v. Galveston Cent. Appraisal Dist.,
236 S.W.3d 335, 336 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
114. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0537 (2007).
115. 249 S.W.3d 68, 72 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 72-73.
119. Id. at 72.
120. Id. at 73.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 72-74.
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agencies and that the protest of their appraisal was improper because
only the property owner of record-and not the property owner and an-
other party jointly-has standing to protest an appraisal.12 4 The district's
and board's standing argument rested in part on the premise that the en-
tire protest was invalid because Valero had joined the dispute even
though it was only a lessee during the relevant period and not a properly
designated property tax agent of MHCB. 125
The district court granted the district's and board's plea with respect to
the taxpayers' primary allegations dealing with the appraisal agreement,
but denied it with respect to the unfairness of the reappraised value.126
Both sides appealed.
The First Court of Appeals in Houston considered first the claim that
the taxpayers did not have standing to challenge the reappraisal values
because they filed jointly.1 27 The court rejected this argument, conclud-
ing that the appeal before them was really two arguments, one by each of
MHCB and Valero. Since Valero acquired the refinery prior to the dead-
line to challenge an appraisal, the court held that it had standing to make
the protest.'28 However, the court found that to the extent that MHCB
could have made a separate protest, it did not have standing, and there-
fore its protest would not be considered. 129
The court next addressed whether the appraisal agreement between the
district and Valero was binding on the district.' 30 On this point, the court
concluded that Texas Tax Code section 1.111(e) which allows final agree-
ments as to property value between a property owner and an appraisal
district, does not permit a district to rescind an agreement.131 Therefore,
the court determined that the taxpayers' suit was not one for breach of
contract which would have been barred by the affirmative defense of sov-
ereign immunity but was one to construe the meaning of section 1.111(e)
and to determine whether the district and board exceeded their statutory
authority in rescinding that agreement. 132 The court ultimately reversed
and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings to address the
taxpayers' claims regarding the appraisal agreement. 133
In two other cases, the Houston First and Fourteenth District Courts of
Appeals also considered the question of when an appraisal agreement is
binding on the appraisal district and on the taxpayer.134 In each case, the
124. Id. at 74-75.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 77-79.
128. Id. at 78-79.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 79.
131. Id. at 82-84 (interpreting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 1.111(e) (Vernon 2008))..
132. Id. at 83-84.
133. Id. at 90.
134. Hartman v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 251 S.W.3d 595 (Tex. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 2007, pet. denied); Sondock v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 231 S.W.3d 65(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
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court held that a taxpayer's presentation at an appraisal review board
hearing of an agreed-upon property value and the district's subsequent
drafting of an appraisal agreement such renders an agreement as binding
and unappealable to district court.
135
In another valuation case, Western AH 406 Ltd. v. Central Appraisal
District of Taylor County, the Eastland Court of Appeals considered an
appraisal protest by the owner of an apartment complex that provided
housing for military personnel and their families under a contractual ar-
rangement with the Air Force. 136 Western had lost on its arguments at
trial that properties that were similarly encumbered by contractual ar-
rangements such as the one it had with the Air Force should be consid-
ered by the district in determining its valuation for the tax year.137 In
reversing the trial court, the court of appeals held that section 23.01138
requires a property's market value to be determined in accordance with
generally accepted appraisal methods, and pointed to the Uniform Stan-
dards of Appraisal Practice Rule 1-2(e)(iv), which states that such con-
tracts are individual characteristics of a property, and therefore should be
considered in valuing the property.
139
The San Antonio and Houston First District Courts of Appeals consid-
ered two similar cases involving a limited partnership's argument that it
was entitled to the section 11.182 property tax exemption for community
housing development organizations 140 because its general partner was a
Community Housing Development Corporation ("CHDO"); in both in-
stances, the court of appeals ruled against the taxpayers.141 In rendering
their decisions, the courts relied on the requirements that tax exemptions
are to be strictly construed and doubts resolved against exemptions.
142
The courts held that the section 11.182(e) requirement that a CHDO
"'control 100 percent of the interest in the general partner if the [housing
development] project is owned by a limited partnership,"' was to be con-
strued as additional to-and not in place of-the section 11.182(b) re-
quirement that the entity seeking the exemption must itself be a
CHDO.143
These opinions appear contrary to a prior decision on similar facts in
TRQ Captain's Landing, L.P. v. Galveston Central Appraisal District by
the First Houston Court of Appeals-the same court that decided Prim-
135. See Hartman, 251 S.W.3d at 60; Sondock, 231 S.W.3d at 69.
136. 213 S.W.3d 544, 545 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, pet. denied).
137. Id.
138. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 23.01 (Vernon 2008).
139. W. AH 406, 213 S.W.3d at 546-47.
140. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.182 (Vernon 2008).
141. Jim Wells County Appraisal Dist. v. Cameron Vill., Ltd., 238 S.W.3d 769, 778-79
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007, pet. filed); Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Primrose
Houston 7 Housing, L.P., 238 S.W.3d 782, 788 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, pet.
filed).
142. Cameron, 238 S.W.3d at 772; Primrose, 238 S.W.3d at 786.
143. Cameron, 238 S.W.3d at 781; Primrose, 238 S.W.3d at 786.
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rose against the taxpayer.14 4 The Houston court drew a distinction be-
tween the facts in the two cases by reasoning that, unlike TRQ, the
taxpayer in Primrose did not have equitable title to the property at issue
because it did not have the present right to compel legal title.145 The
opinions are also interesting in light of the point made by the taxpayers
and the dissent in Cameron, is, that the court's strict reading of the statu-
tory language arguably renders a portion of section 11.182(e) meaning-
less. 146 Expect further appeals and a possible supreme court opinion to
settle this issue.
The Attorney General's office issued an interesting opinion consider-
ing whether an appraisal district's use of its in-house counsel to advise the
district's appraisal review board-which hears protests against district ap-
praisals brought by taxpayers-should be barred as ex parte communica-
tions between the review board and the district.147 The opinion looks
first to section 41.66(f), which prohibits appraisal review board members
from communicating the facts or evidence related to a property owner's
protest, or the property that is the subject of a protest with any person-
including a district employee-outside a public hearing. 148 It also notes
that section 6.411 criminalizes such ex parte communications, though it
excepts communications between a review board and its legal counsel.1 49
A provision in section 6.43 allows a review board to use an appraisal dis-
trict's clerical staff when the board's budget does not allow for such sup-
port separately.1 50 The opinion nonetheless concludes that a review
board's quasi-judicial function, combined with the clear statutory codifi-
cation of the traditional ban on judicial ex parte communications, re-
quires a finding that an appraisal review board's own use of a district's in-
house counsel is banned as prohibited ex parte communications. 151
IV. PROCEDURE
A. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
The 2007 legislative session added a new section to the Tax Code to
effect the transfer of contested cases to the State Office of Administrative
Hearings.1 52 In addition, a section was added to confer exclusive jurisdic-
tion to the district court of Travis County for suits that challenge a collec-
tion action. 153 New provisions also address payment and collection of
taxes, circumstances in which a person is presumed to have received or
144. 212 S.W.3d 726, 728-30 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, pet. granted).
145. Primrose, 238 S.W.3d at 787.
146. Cameron, 238 S.W.3d at 775, 781.
147. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0556 (2007).
148. Id. (interpreting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 41.66(f) (Vernon 2008).
149. Id. (interpreting TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.411 (Vernon 2008)).
150. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.43 (Vernon 2008).
151. Op. Tex. Att'y Gen. No. GA-0556 (2007).




collected a tax, and the tolling of the statute of limitations. 154 Another
change concerns the seizure and sale of property, specifically providing
that certain activities constitute interference with the comptroller's
seizure of the property and consequently are misdemeanors.155 The legis-
lature also added a section regarding tax evasion, which details when an
officer, manager, director, or partner will be held personally liable in con-
nection with a fraudulent "scheme" or "plan" to evade taxes.' 56 Other
sections were enacted to tighten the comptroller's authority to address
the electronic transfer of certain payments, 157 the electronic filing of cer-
tain reports, 58 and actions to determine the validity of a state tax lien.'
59
B. JUDICIAL DECISIONS
In Neely v. West Orange-Cove Consolidated Independent School Dis-
trict, the Austin Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court's granting of
attorneys' fees was equitable and just, and that the state had waived its
argument regarding the attorney's fees by not asserting it on direct appeal
to the Texas Supreme Court. 160 The state claimed that the school districts
were ineligible for attorneys' fees because under the Uniform Declara-
tory Judgments Act a declaratory judgment may not be used solely as a
vehicle to obtain attorneys' fees, and that the trial court abused its discre-
tion in awarding fees to parties that did not prevail on its claims.' 61 The
court of appeals reviewed the case although the State waived its argu-
ment because it may review the trial court's award to ensure it was equi-
table and just. The court affirmed and found no abuse of discretion. 162
The Austin Court of Appeals in Levy v. OfficeMax, Inc. reversed and
remanded the trial court's decision granting a plea seeking to compel an
assignment of the right to receive a tax refund via a class action suit.
163
The issue was whether customers who receive a rebate on a retail
purchase could pursue a class action against the retailer to obtain an as-
signment of refund rights in order to file a tax refund claim with the
State.164 The court found that "district courts in Texas are courts of gen-
eral jurisdiction with the power to 'hear and determine any cause ... ' and
to 'grant any relief. . .'"; therefore, at least according to this decision, the
district court had jurisdiction to consider claims against the retailers for






160. 228 S.W. 864, 869 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, pet. denied). See also Cynthia M.
Ohlenforst et al., Taxation, 58 SMU L. REV. 1159, 1172 (2005); Ohlenforst et al., supra
note 35, at 1316 (discussing this case as it impacted school funding and influenced 2006
legislative changes to both property and franchise tax provisions).
161. Neeley, 228 S.W.3d at 867-68.
162. Id.
163. Levy v. OfficeMax, Inc., 228 S.W.3d 846 (Tex. App.-Austin 2007, no pet.).
164. Id. at 848.
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assignment of refund rights.165 Similarly, the court found that the comp-
troller had no jurisdiction to compel an assignment from the retailer.
In Bashaw v. State, the court determined that the statute of limitations
did not toll for filing a petition for bill of review in a motor vehicles sales
tax collection suit. 166 An automatic stay which prevented Bashaw from
filing his bill of review while his bankruptcy proceeding was pending did
not toll the filing deadline for a bill of review. Bashaw's filing therefore
was untimely. 167 The court concluded that regardless of whether the au-
tomatic stay provision applies, Bashaw's petition for bill of review was
untimely under two theories: (1) if treated as bill of review, it would not
toll for the length of the automatic stay; and (2) if treated like a com-
mencement of a new action against the comptroller, the automatic stay
would not apply and consequently the four-year statute of limitations
passed. 168
The Fifth Circuit affirmed a district court holding under the Texas Un-
claimed Property Law. 169 In Arnett v. Combs, the court dismissed Ar-
nett's claims alleging that the comptroller's practice of retaining revenue
generated from unclaimed property held by the State constitutes a taking
without just compensation on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds.
The court also dismissed his motion for class certification on the grounds
that Arnett was not an adequate class representative and class certifica-
tion would serve no useful purpose. In addition, the court found that
Arnett lacked standing to seek declaratory or injunctive relief regarding
return of the revenue generated from the unclaimed property.
170
V. CONCLUSION
As in virtually every Survey period, the number of cases, rules, and
legislative changes exceeds the scope of a relatively short survey article.
Moreover, the changes discussed in this article are likely to trigger more
cases and-with the legislature's next session beginning in January
2009-more legislative changes as well.
165. Id. at 851.
166. Bashaw v. State, No. 03-05-00745-CV, 2007 Tex. App. LEXIS 4152, at *1 (Tex.
App.-Austin 2007, no pet.) (mem. op.).
167. Id. at *4.
168. Id. at *8-9.
169. Arnett v. Combs, 508 F.3d 1134, 1134 (5th Cir. 2007).
170. Id.
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